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I. Introduction 
Technology is progressing at an exponential rate.  Consumers buy the latest and greatest 
devices knowing full well that as soon as they open the package of their “new” technology it will 
become obsolete.  It is like shoveling sand against the tide – no one will ever be able to keep up – 
especially not the legislature and the judicial system.  Licensing contracts are created every day 
for copyrighted works including books, songs, motion pictures, sporting events, and so on.  
However, some older contracts, and even some newer contracts, were created before these new 
technologies were ever even contemplated.  What does that mean for these agreements?  What 
happens to an allegedly “fully integrated” licensing agreement when a new technology is 
invented?  How are the terms of that agreement affected by this new technology?  Who retains 
the rights to exploit the work in this new media, the licensee or the licensor?  Unfortunately, 
these questions are not easy to answer, especially because everyone is always rushing to be the 
first to the marketplace with their exploitation of copyrighted works in a new medium.  Licensors 
and licensees may rush to take advantage of the latest and greatest technological advance before 
stopping to make sure their licenses include the right to exploit a copyrighted work in a new 
medium. 
Unfortunately the law simply cannot keep up with the pace of these technological 
advances, therefore, licensees and licensors have very little guidance from the legislation and the 
judiciary when it comes to determining whether or not the invention of a new technology can be 
exploited under an existing licensing agreement.  Also, by the time the legislation and the 
judiciary weigh in on particular technological advances, there are hundreds or maybe thousands 
of other new technologies created that will still require judicial and legislative guidance.  
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Theoretically, though, if contracts include the five (5) little words “Now known or herein after 
devised” litigation can be avoided.  Is that really the case? 
In order to properly investigate these questions this paper will analyze the existing case 
law involving new technological advances for exploiting copyrighted works.  The first cases 
involve the invention of new technologies for viewing television shows and listening to and 
sharing music files.  The next set of cases involves musical compositions synchronized in motion 
pictures.  Then there are several cases involving new media for the distribution of sound 
recordings and literary works.  After which, there will be an outline of various recommendations 
for someone who is considering whether or not to exploit a licensed work in a new medium but 
in unsure whether or not the current licensing agreement includes this technology  
II. Case Law Background 
a. New Technologies 
In the last twenty (20) years, the courts have tackled various cases involving new 
technologies potentially infringing on copyright holders’ rights.  The legal analysis the courts 
engage in focuses on how the specific technological device or service works.  The way in which 
a device or service specifically handles copyrightable works will affect how the court will 
ultimately determine whether or not this new technological device or service creates the means 
for a copyright infringement to occur.  If the technology creates an electronic copy of the 
copyrighted work without the permission of the copyright holder then an infringement most 
likely has occurred.  
The Ninth Circuit examined this issue in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
1
, where the 
plaintiffs, holders in copyrights in various sound recordings, sued Napster, Inc. (“Napster”), a 
company which allowed users to share music files through peer-to-peer sharing website.
2
  The 
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Ninth Circuit examined how this website and the underlying service actually handled these 
sound recordings.
3
  This technology allowed users to upload copies of the sound recordings onto 
Napster’s server and then allowed other users to search and download those sound recordings 
onto their personal computers via the internet.
4
  Because the technology actually created a digital 
copy of the sound recording and allowed users to obtain a copy of that sound recording without 
providing a royalty to the copyright holder, the Ninth Circuit determined copyright infringement 
did in fact occur.
5
   
Napster attempted to assert the affirmative defense of fair use, but the district court 
disagreed with their argument and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that determination.
6
  In finding for 
the plaintiffs, the Court was forced to consider the best way to assess damages against Napster: 
Imposing a compulsory royalty payment schedule would give 
Napster an ‘easy out’ of this case.  If such royalties were imposed, 
Napster would avoid penalties for any future violation of an 
injunction, statutory copyright damages and any possible criminal 
penalties for continuing infringement.  The royalty structure would 
also grant Napster the luxury of either choosing to continue and 
pay royalties or shut down.  On the other hand, the wronged parties 
would be forced to do business with a company that profits from 
the wrongful use of intellectual properties.  Plaintiffs would lose 
the power to control their intellectual property:  they could not 
make a business decision not to license their property to Napster, 
and, in the event they planned to do business with Napster, 
compulsory royalties would take away the copyright holders’ 
ability to negotiate the terms of any contractual arrangement.
7
 
 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ordered “a partial remand of this case on the date of the filing of this 
opinion for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to proceed with the settlement and 
entry of the modified preliminary injunction.”8 
 In WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.
9
, the plaintiffs were broadcasters of television programming and 
were seeking an injunction against ivi, Inc. (“ivi”), a website that was retransmitting the 
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plaintiffs’ programs over the internet live.10  The District Court issued a preliminary injunction 
on plaintiffs’ behalf and the defendants appealed.11  The Second Circuit noted: 
[i]n a copyright case, a district court may grant a preliminary 
injunction when plaintiffs demonstrate:  (1) a likelihood of success 
on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; 
(3) a balance of the hardships tipping in their favor; and (4) non-
disservice of the public interest by issuance of a preliminary 
injunction.
12
   
 
The court then addressed each prong of the injunctive test.   
For the first prong of the test for an injunction, “Likelihood of Success on the Merits,” the 
Second Circuit used the two (2) step “Chevron Test”13 to determine, “whether ivi, a service that 
streams copyrighted programming live and over the Internet, constituted a cable system under § 
111 of the Copyright Act.  If so, ivi had a statutory defense to plaintiffs’ claim of copyright 
infringement, and ivi was entitled to a compulsory license to continue retransmitting plaintiffs’ 
programming.”14  The court noted, “[that it was] unclear whether such a service (1) [was] or 
utilize[d] a ‘facility’ (2) that receive[d] and retransmit[ed] signals (3) through wires, cables, 
microwave, or other communication channels.”15  
Because the statute was unclear on this issue the Court then turned to the legislative 
history to try to determine whether or not ivi should have been considered a cable system.
16
  The 
Court ultimately concluded, “Congress did not intend for § 111’s compulsory license to extend 
to internet retransmissions.  To the extent that there [was] any doubt as to Congress’s intent, 
however, we proceed to Chevron step two, and we conclude that the position of the Copyright 
Office eliminated such doubt in its entirety.”17   
With regards to the second Chevron step the Court held, “(1) the statutory text [was] 
ambiguous as to whether ivi, a service that retransmits television programming over the Internet, 
[was] entitled to a compulsory license under § 111; (2) the statute’s legislative history, 
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development, and purpose indicate[d] that Congress did not intend for § 111 licenses to extend to 
Internet retransmissions; (3) the Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 111 – that Internet 
retransmission services [did] not constitute cable systems under § 111 – align[ed] with 
Congress’s intent and [was] reasonable; and (4) accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that plaintiffs were like to succeed on the merits of the case.”18 
 The Second Circuit then analyzed the next element needed for an injunction “Irreparable 
Injury.”19  For three (3) reasons the court held the plaintiffs would suffer “irreparable injury”:  
(1) “ivi’s actions harm[ed] plaintiff’s retransmission and advertising revenues by substantially 
diminishing the value of their copyrighted programming”20; (2) “plaintiff’s losses would be 
difficult to measure and monetary damages would be insufficient to remedy the harms”21; and (3) 
if the plaintiffs were to succeed on the merits, ivi would have been put out of business and 
therefore have been unable to pay any damages awarded to the plaintiffs.
22
   
For the next element “Balance of Hardships” the Second Circuit determined the plaintiffs 
had sufficiently demonstrated that “[t]he balance of hardships, therefore, clearly tip[ped] in 
plaintiffs’ favor.”23  Finally, for the final element “public interest” the Court noted, “the public 
ha[d] a compelling interest in protecting copyright owners’ marketable rights to their work and 
the economic incentive to continue creating television programming.”24  Therefore, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs.25 
 In another broadcasting case, WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc.,
26
 
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. (“WGN”) was a “Superstation” in Chicago that utilized a 
new technology called “teletext,” which allowed WGM to transmit teletexts along with their 
broadcast of the nightly news.
27
  Because WGN [was] a “Superstation” it could not reach their 
audiences in Albuquerque without the help of the defendant, United Video, Inc. (“United 
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Video”), which retransmitted the signal to the local cable affiliate.28  However, when United 
Video retransmitted the signal, it removed WGN’s teletext and included their own.29  WGN sued 
for copyright infringement, the district court found in favor of the defendants and WGN 
appealed.
30
   
The circumstances surrounding the relationship between the parties created a unique 
analysis; the Seventh Circuit noted, “[i]t used to be that a cable system that picked up and 
retransmitted a broadcast signal containing a copyrighted program was not an infringer. But the 
Copyright Act of 1976 changed this, though it allow[ed] a cable system to pick up and retransmit 
broadcast signals without the copyright owner’s so long as it pays him royalties as fixed in the 
statute.”31   Although the ultimate transmission, made by the local affiliate that contained the 
changes made by United Video, the infringement was actually implemented by United Video 
before they transmited to the local affiliate:  “The cable system select[ed] the signals it want[ed] 
to retransmit, pays the copyright owners for the right to retransmit their programs, and pa[id] the 
intermediate carrier a fee for getting the signal from the broadcast station to the cable system.  
The intermediate carrier pa[id] the copyright owners nothing, provided it really [was] passive in 
relation to what it transmit[ed], like a telephone company.”32   
The dilemma this system created was “United Video could mutilate to its heart’s content 
the broadcast signal it picked up and the copyright owner would have no recourse against it.  His 
only recourse would be against the cable systems – more than a thousand in the case of WGN – a 
thousand or more copyright infringement suits instead of one.”33  The Seventh Circuit held 
“United Video [could not] avail itself of the passive carrier exception, because it was not passive 
– it did not retransmit WGN’s signal intact.”34  Therefore, the Court upheld WGN’s injunction 
against United Video.
35
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 These cases demonstrate the struggles the courts have had trying to keep pace with these 
modern technological advances.  When a statute does not specifically address a technological 
device or service the courts have had to look elsewhere to opine how the legislature would have 
intended to treat this new technological medium had it been available when the statute was 
written.  With regards to the statute in WPIX, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the legislative history 
and legislative intent to anticipate how the legislature would have responded to ivi transmitting 
live copyrighted programming over the internet.
36
  As the cases below will demonstrate, when 
the case involves a contract between a licensee and a licensor the court, when they deem a 
contract is ambiguous, will also examine extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties 
initially intended before the technological advance was invented.   
b. Motion Pictures and Musical Compositions 
In the modern world motion pictures and musical compositions go hand-in-hand.  It is 
almost impossible to imagine a modern motion picture without a musical score.  Most motion 
pictures in the modern world have a corresponding soundtrack album, which is released for sale 
containing at least some of the songs from the motion picture.  A song can become a major hit 
simply by appearing in a blockbuster motion picture.   
According to Song-Database.com “Unchained Melody” by the Righteous Brothers spent 
thirteen (13) weeks on the Billboard charts after its initial release in 1965.
37
  However, almost 
thirty-five (35) years later, after the song appeared in the motion picture, Ghost starring Demi 
Moore and Patrick Swayze
38
, the song reappeared on the Billboard charts again.  This time the 
song spent another forty-four (44) weeks on the Billboard charts.
39
  Success like this can make 
the incentive to clarify the terms of master recording’s licensing agreements imperative.  The 
courts have tackled this issue on several occasions. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Bourne v. Walt 
Disney Co.
40
 in 1995.  The case involved an agreement between Walt Disney Co. (“Disney”) and 
Beebe Bourne, d/b/a Bourne Co. (“Bourne”) for the licensing rights to all the musical 
compositions appearing in Disney’s animated motion pictures.41  Over a series of agreements and 
amendments Disney conveyed the publishing rights to these musical compositions to Irving 
Berlin, Inc., the predecessor of Bourne, when each film was originally released.
42
  The parties 
later entered into a settlement agreement in 1965 which allowed Disney “a license in the 
theatrical motion picture and television grand performing rights in the Compositions, as defined 
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, nothing in the settlement 
agreement gave Disney the right to synchronize or fix the Compositions on videocassette.”43  
Years later, Disney released Snow White and Pinocchio on videocassette but did not seek an 
additional license from Bourne for the musical compositions contained therein.
44
  Bourne sued 
Disney for copyright infringement and sought damages for the royalties from the sales of the 
videocassettes.
45
   
The jury concluded “Disney infringed Bourne’s copyrights by using the Compositions in 
television advertising.”46  However, “concerning Disney’s right to use the Compositions in 
videocassettes, the jury found for Disney.”  47  Both parties appealed.48  The Second Circuit first 
discussed Disney’s right to exploit the compositions in synchronization with the motion pictures 
on videocassette.
49
  The first issue regarding these rights concerned contract integration.
50
  If the 
multiple agreements entered into between the parties were fully integrated then there would be 
no need for further court interpretation of the contract terms.  
51
   
The Second Circuit noted, “[i]f, as Bourne contends, the 1937 Assignment Agreement 
was intended to constitute the entire agreement concerning the musical compositions from Snow 
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White, then Disney would have been left with no right to use the compositions in the original 
release of the motion picture in 1937 or in any subsequent releases.”52  The Court found that this 
was unlikely to be the intent of either party.
53
  The Court stated, “the evidence demonstrate[d] an 
implied understanding between Disney and Bourne that Disney’s rights to the Snow White 
compositions were to be controlled by the 1933 Shorts Agreement.”54  Therefore, the Court held 
the terms of this implied contract were a question of fact for their jury to decide.
55
   
The next question for the Second Circuit to consider was whether “motion picture” rights 
included the right to distribute the motion pictures on videocassettes.
56
  Bourne argued 
videocassettes were not contemplated in the 1930s when these contracts were negotiated, and 
therefore the right to distribute the motion pictures on videocassette could not have been 
included in the terms of the original agreements.
57
  The Court noted, “[i]f the production of home 
videocassettes clearly f[ell] outside the scope of the grants, then Disney’s use of the 
Compositions was unauthorized as a matter of law, and, therefore, the district court erred in 
submitting this question to the jury.”58   
The Second Circuit did not agree “that the term ‘motion picture’ ha[d] a sufficiently 
definite and precise meaning as to allow for interpretation as a matter of law.”59  Disney’s expert 
also noted, “there is no practical difference between storing a motion picture on film, 
videocassette, or any other storage media.”60  Based on this testimony and other evidence offered 
by Disney that, “even in the 1930s Disney made available certain short subject cartoons for home 
viewing,” the Second Circuit agreed a jury determination with regards to the distribution on 
videocassettes was also proper.
61
   
Finally, Disney argued its distribution of the videocassettes “without any express license 
from Bourne” was covered under “the first sale doctrine.”62  “Bourne argue[d] that Disney, even 
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if it lawfully possessed he videocassettes, did not acquire the videocassettes as a result of a ‘first 
sale’ by Bourne, the copyright owner.  Since no transfer of copies passed from Bourne to Disney, 
Bourne argue[d] that no ‘first sale’ ha[d] occurred.”63  The Second Circuit disagreed with this 
argument because “Disney, was licensed by Bourne to exploit the copyrighted compositions in 
connection with its motion pictures.  Having so licensed Disney, we do not see any good reason 
why Disney should [have] not [been] able to dispose of these lawfully made copies as it wishes.”  
64
   
In a slightly less complicated case, Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc.
65
, the Court of 
Appeals of New York considered whether a 1963 contract between the musical group, “The 
Ronettes”, and defendant production company, Philles Records, Inc., (“Philles”) allowed for 
exploitation of the groups’ songs in motion pictures, specifically the 1987 hit Dirty Dancing.66  
The original contract conveyed: 
All recordings made hereunder and all records and reproductions 
made therefrom together with the performances embodies therein, 
shall be entirely Philles’ property, free of any claims whatsoever 
by you or any person deriving any rights of interest from you.  
Without limitation to the foregoing, Philles shall have the right to 
make phonograph records, tape recordings or other reproductions 
of the performances embodied in such recordings by any method 
now or hereafter known, and to sell and deal in the same under any 
trade mark or trade names or labels designated by us, or we may at 
our election refrain therefrom.
67
 
 
The Court of Appeals noted, “[d]espite the technological innovations that continue[d] to 
revolutionize the recording industry, long-settled common-law contract rules still govern[ed] the 
interpretation of agreements between artists and their record producers.”68  The trial court found 
in favor of “The Ronettes” that the original agreement did not allow for synchronization rights 
and determined damages were “approximately $3 million.”69  “The Appellate Division affirmed, 
concluding that defendants’ actions were not authorized by the agreement with plaintiffs because 
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the contract did not specifically transfer the right to issue synchronization and third-party 
domestic distribution licenses.”70   
The Court of Appeals sought to answer the question, “does the contract’s silence on 
synchronization and domestic licensing create an ambiguity when [it?] opens the door to the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties?”71  The Court noted, 
“New York has well-established precedent on the issue of whether a grantor retains any rights to 
artistic property once it [was?] unconditionally transferred.”72  However, “[i]n this case, 
plaintiffs concede[d] that defendants own[ed] the master recordings.  Notably, the agreement 
explicitly refer[red] to defendants’ ‘right to make phonograph records, tape recordings or other 
reproductions of the performances embodied in such recordings by any method now or hereafter 
known, and sell and deal in the same.’”73   
The Court of Appeals determined this contract was not ambiguous and therefore 
defendants were within their rights to exploit the synchronization rights of the “The Ronettes” 
hits.
74
  However, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to the 
portion of those synchronization rights royalties due to “The Ronettes.”75  The court noted, 
“[h]owever sympathetic plaintiffs’ plight, we [could not] resolve the case on that ground under 
the guise of contract construction.”76 
 The interesting distinction between this case and the Walt Disney case was the presence 
of the “magic phrase,” “by any method now or hereafter known,” included in the licensing 
agreement.
77
  Despite this contractual language the Court still determined “The Ronettes” were 
owed royalties for the synchronization rights.
78
  This was presumably in the interest of fairness – 
the Court did not want to allow the production company to reap all the benefits of the 
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synchronization rights to this wildly successful blockbuster motion picture without compensating 
the artists with at least a reasonable royalty.   
Money is a common theme in these cases.  Theoretically, though, infringers should 
consider this before they exploit another’s copyrighted work in a new medium.  Perhaps the 
infringers feel the potential royalties they might owe to the copyright holders are not sufficient 
enough to warrant litigation or they feel the injured copyright holder is not going to be in a 
financial position to afford the attorneys’ fees for a lengthy litigation against a big corporation.  
 In another similar case, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc.,
79
 the 
plaintiffs were the successors of the songwriters of the song “Bye, Bye Blackbird” who 
“assigned their interests in the copyright to defendant Warner–Chappell's predecessor in 
interest.”80  After which, defendant granted A & M Records (“A & M”) a mechanical license  
that provided for a “non-exclusive license to use, in whole or in part, [defendant's] copyrighted 
musical composition entitled ‘Bye Bye Blackbird’81 (Dixon–Henderson) in the recording and 
manufacturing of phonograph records to be manufactured and sold only in the United States....”82  
Subsequently, the plaintiff issued a synchronization license to Tristar Pictures, Inc. (“Tristar”) to 
use the song in the hit motion picture Sleepless in Seattle.
83
   
However, the litigation arose when Tristar contracted with Sony Music Entertainment, 
Inc. (“Sony”) to include the song on the soundtrack for the motion picture.84  “Plaintiff, however, 
contend[ed] that defendant [was] not entitled to royalties for the Sleepless Soundtrack Album 
because, ‘under the terms of the grant’, the only rights that defendant retained after termination 
were limited by its license with A & M. Put another way, plaintiff claim[ed] that the only right 
that defendant may retain with respect to the composition [was] to those royalties that arise from 
the production of phonorecords of the Cocker Derivative.”85   
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The District Court for the Southern District of New York held, “the language here [was] 
very narrow and grant[ed] to A & M only the right to manufacture phonorecords of the Joe 
Cocker recording on Record No. SP 4182.”86  Therefore, the Court held the plaintiff was entitled 
to royalties from Sony for the use of the song on the soundtrack and granted summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff.
87
 
 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.,
88
 involved a composer, 
Igor Stravinsky (“Stravinsky”), whose composition, which was assigned to Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishers, Ltd. (“Boosey”), appeared in Disney’s classic musical motion picture, 
Fantasia.
89
  Boosey argued the initial license from Stravinsky to Disney in 1939 did not include 
the right to exploit the work in foreign home videos such as “video cassette and laser disc format 
(“video format”).”90  “Because under United States law the work was in the public domain, 
Disney needed no authorization to record or distribute it in this country, but permission was 
required for distribution in countries where Stravinsky enjoyed copyright protection.”91  The 
Court then noted, “[t]he 1939 Agreement convey[ed] the right ‘to record [the composition] in 
any manner, medium or form’ for use ‘in [a] motion picture.’  We believe[d] this language [was] 
broad enough to include distribution of the motion picture in video format.”92   
The Second Circuit reasoned, “new-use analysis should rely on neutral principles of 
contract interpretation rather than solicitude for either party.”93  The Court considered standard 
contract law when coming to this conclusion:  “If the contract [was] more reasonably read to 
convey one meaning, the party benefitted by that reading should [have been] able to rely on it; 
the party seeking exception or deviation from the meaning reasonably conveyed by the words of 
the contract should have bear[ed] the burden of negotiating for language that would express the 
limitation or deviation. This principle favor[ed] neither licensors nor licensees.  It follow[ed] 
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simply from the words of the contract.”94  Therefore, the Second Circuit remanded the case back 
to the trial court, the Southern District of New York, for a determination of the limits of the 
licensing agreement and the contract claims.
95
 
c. Sound Recordings 
Older contracts for the rights in sound recordings also create problems with regards to 
new technological devices and services.  When certain rights contracts were entered into, the 
only means of exploiting a sound recording were phonorecords and radio airplay.  With the 
invention of the compact disc and MP3, numerous new ways emerged to exploit a master sound 
recording digitally.  Also unlike tangible mediums like phonorecords, digital copies are much 
easier to create, much less expensive to exploit and much easier to share.  These new 
technologies have created a whole new wave of litigation surrounding these uncontemplated uses 
of sound recordings. 
In a case arising in Tennessee, Polygram Records, Inc. v. Legacy Entertainment Group, 
LLC
96
, the heirs of country singer Hank Williams sued for the rights to sound recordings 
produced for play airplay on a Nashville radio station in the 1950s.
97
   
Williams and his band, The Drifting Cowboys, frequently 
performed live and by pre-recordings on a WSM
98
 radio program 
known as Mother’s Best Flour.  The pre-recordings were preserved 
on acetate records for broadcast on days Williams and the Drifting 
Cowboys were on tour or otherwise unavailable.  WSM only used 
the acetate recordings to facilitate daily broadcasts of the Mother’s 
Best Flour program; it never exploited the acetate recordings to 
produce phonograph records.
99
 
 
Two (2) other companies were competing with the heirs for the rights to the sounds 
recordings.
100
  Legacy Entertainment Group (“Legacy”) bought the sound recordings from a man 
named Hillous Butrum (“Butrum”), who was a member of Williams’s band the “Drifting 
Cowboys,” who had purchased the sound recordings from Les Leverett (“Leverett”) for the 
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purpose of exploiting them in a commercial manner.
101
  Leverett was a former employee of 
WSM, the radio station which produced the sound recordings for radio airplay.
102
   
Leverett had obtained possession of the physical sound recordings from WSM when he 
rescued them from the trash when the station was moving to a new office.
103
  Legacy argued they 
had acquired the licensing rights from WSM along with the physical sound recordings.
104
  The 
Court held, “[p]ossession of a tangible embodiment of a work or performance such as the 
recordings at issue convey[ed] no rights or ownership interest to the tangible rights embodied 
therein, especially the right to commercially exploit the performances embodied therein.”105  The 
Court further noted, “there is no evidence to support Legacy’s claim that it acquired any rights to 
the performances of Hank Williams embodied in the recordings.”106   
 The other company claiming rights to the sound recordings was Polygram Records, Inc. 
(“Polygram”).107  Polygram was the successor of MGM Records (“MGM”) who had entered into 
an exclusive recording contract with Hank Williams during the time the sound recordings were 
originally created.
108
   
The contract between Williams and MGM was in the form of a 
letter from MGM to Williams employing Williams’ ‘exclusive 
personal services … for the purposes of making phonograph 
records, as MGM may require.’  The contract also provided, 
‘during the period of this contract William will not perform for the 
purpose of making phonograph records for any person other than 
MGM…’109 
 
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held although this language granted MGM exclusive rights 
to any sound recording made for the purposes of “making phonograph records,” “nothing in the 
contract affords MGM or Polygraph the present right to exploit recordings of performances by 
Hank Williams that were for purposes other than producing phonograph records, such as pre-
recorded radio broadcast.”110  Therefore the Court held because the sound recordings were made 
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for radio airplay only that Polygraph did not have rights to the sound recordings either.
111
  The 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee held, “[t]he trial court’s dismissal of all claims of Legacy and 
Polygram based upon the conclusions that neither has any right or interest in recordings at issue, 
and our affirmance thereof, renders the issue moot because neither Legacy or Polygram have 
standing to challenge the rights of the heirs of Hank Williams.”112 
 The Southern District of New York held in Reinhardt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
113
 the 
words “now or hereafter known” in a licensing contract were sufficient to allow the digital 
distribution of sound recordings.
114
  Richard Reinhardt (“Reinhardt”), a former member of the 
band, “The Ramones”, brought a copyright infringement action against retailers and distributors 
for exploiting digital versions of his songs without his express permission.
115
  The agreement 
read as follows: 
[S]ection 5(a) of the Recording Agreement authorizes Ramones 
Productions “to manufacture, advertise, sell, distribute, lease, 
license or otherwise use or dispose of the Masters and 
phonograph records embodying the Masters, in any or all fields 
of use, by any method now or hereafter known.”  
 
The Recording Agreement also provides that “‘Records,’ 
‘phonograph records,’ ‘recordings,’ and ‘derivatives' means all 
forms of reproduction including pre-recorded tapes and discs 
and electronic video recordings, now or hereafter known, 
manufactured or sold primarily for home use, school use, juke 
box use or use on means of transportation....” “Master” 
however, is specifically defined as “the equivalent of a 7 inch, 
45 rpm, single-sided recording embodying the recorded 
performances by the Ramones.”116 
 
The Southern District of New York interpreted this language to include the right to exploit 
digital copies of the song.
117
  Therefore, the Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.118 
 F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records
119
 involved a dispute over royalties for 
iTunes downloads and cellular telephone ringtone downloads for the recording artist Marshal B. 
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Mathers, III, otherwise known as the rap star, Eminem.
120
  Eminem initially signed a recording 
contract with FBT, who in turn transferred those exclusive recording rights to Aftermath Records 
(“Aftermath”).121  According to the agreement between Aftermath and FBT, Aftermath was 
obligated to pay FBT “between 12% and 20% of the adjusted retail price of all ‘full price records 
sold in the United States…through normal retail channels.’”122  The agreement also entitled FBT 
to fifty percent (50%) of the net receipts for any license involving the “manufacture and sale of 
records or for any other uses.”123  Subsequently, UMG Recordings, Inc. (“UMG”), as the parent 
company of Aftermath, entered into an agreement with iTunes.
124
  Aftermath also entered into 
agreements with cellphone carriers in order to sell digital downloads of Eminem ringtones to 
their customers.
125
   
 FBT conducted an audit of Aftermath’s financial records in order to confirm the royalty 
rate it was receiving for Eminem’s masters and thereafter brought a suit against Aftermath for 
unpaid royalties.
126
  A jury held in favor of Aftermath and FBT appealed.
127
   The first question 
for the Ninth Circuit on appeal was whether or not the contracts were ambiguous.
128
  Specifically 
the Court needed to determine whether or not iTunes should be considered “normal retail 
channels.”129  The Court noted, “the agreements also provide that ‘notwithstanding’ the Records 
Sold provisions, F.B.T. is to receive a 50% royalty on ‘masters licensed by [Aftermath]…to 
others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any other uses.’”130  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that the parties’ use of the term “notwithstanding” indicate[d] that FBT [was] entitled 
to a 50% royalty if an Eminem master [was] licensed to a third party.
131
 
 The Court analyzed the difference between a “sale” of a copyrighted work versus a 
“license” of a copyrighted work.132  Aftermath owned the rights to the Eminem masters and 
contracted with Apple to sell digital downloads of the masters on iTunes.
133
  The Ninth Circuit 
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concluded the contract between Aftermath and Apple for the iTunes downloads was a license of 
Aftermath’s copyright.134   
 The contract between Aftermath and Eminem “provided that Aftermath had the right to 
exploit the ‘masters in any all form of media now known or hereinafter developed.’”135  The 
Court concluded the contracts provided that Aftermath was entitled to a 50% royalty for the 
licensing of the masters as iTunes downloads and ringtone downloads.
136
  Therefore the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FBT and remanded the 
case to the trial court.
137
 
d. Literary Works 
The invention of the “ebook” became the basis for the litigation in Random House, Inc. v. 
Rosetta Books LLC
138
.  Rosetta Books LLC (Rosetta) contracted directly with authors of several 
literary works published in print paperback and hardcover form by the plaintiff, Random House, 
Inc. (“Random House”).139  The Southern District of New York analyzed each authors’ 
agreement with Random House separately.
140
  The Court noted, “Random House contend[ed] 
that the phrase ‘in book form’ mea[nt] to faithfully reproduce the author's text in its complete 
form as a reading experience and that, since ebooks concededly contain[ed] the complete text of 
the work, Rosetta [could not] also possess those rights.  Random House reason[ed] that because 
the authors could not permit any material that would injure the sale of the work to be published 
without Random House's consent, the authors must have granted the right to publish ebooks to 
Random House.”141  The District Court held “Random House [was] not likely to succeed on the 
merits of its copyright infringement claim and [could not] demonstrate irreparable harm” and 
therefore denied Random House a preliminary injunction.
142
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In a similar case involving freelance writers and photographers for National Geographic, 
Faulkner v. National Geographic Enterprises, Inc.,
143
 whose copyrighted works were later used 
in an electronic database without their consent.  “These photographs and writings have now been 
published in ‘The Complete National Geographic’ (“CNG”), a digital collection of the past 
issues of the Magazine that offers users various means of searching, viewing, and displaying 
pages of these issues.”144  The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
after the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of National 
Geographic.
145
  In order to create the CNG each issue of National Geographic was scanned into a 
computer to create a digital record for every issue going back to 1888.
146
  “Because of some 
contractual arrangements excluding electronic reproduction, approximately 60 out of 180,000 
images have been blacked out in some iterations of the CNG.  None of these images [were] at 
issue in this case. Except for the blacked-out images, there [were] no changes in the content, 
format, or appearance of the issues of the magazine.”147  A user of the CNG could scan through 
the images of the magazine and [saw] exactly what he or she would have seen if they were 
flipping through a paper copy of the magazine.
148
   
National Geographic argued that the CNG provided an exact replica of the magazine as it 
originally appeared in the paper version and similar to a microfilm copy.
149
  The Second Circuit 
noted: 
The district court determined that in all but a few circumstances 
none of the contractual agreements between the parties overrode 
application of Section 201(c)'s default provisions. The Faulkner 
appellants argue that their contracts   were “intended to grant NGS 
limited publication rights in paper format only,” and accordingly 
the Section 201(c) privilege is not applicable. We again 
disagree.
150
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The Second Circuit held, “The transfer of a work from one medium to another generally [did] 
not alter its character for copyright purposes.”151  Also the Court held that if the copyright 
holders intended to retain their rights to exploit their works in a digital format, then they should 
have specifically contracted for that limitation.
152
   
 However, one plaintiff, Psihoyos, was a copyright holder of two (2) photographs, whose 
contract expressly declined to convey rights to digital versions of his works, was excluded from 
the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment.153  Psihoyos also argued there 
were other photographs that were mistakenly included in the summary judgment that likewise 
should have been excluded with his other two (2) photographs.
154
  The Second Circuit reversed 
the district court’s summary judgment with regards to these additional Psihoyos photographs, but 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of National Geographic for the other works.
155
   
III. Analysis 
New technologies continue to create new legal questions for the legislature, judiciary and 
intellectual property attorneys.  Given the rapid pace at which technological advances are 
entering the main stream every day and the lag time between the time of their inception and the 
time it takes for the judiciary and/or legislature to weigh in on their implications, it does not 
appear that this litigation trend is going to slow down any time soon.  “Now Known or 
Hereinafter Devised” are five (5) words that may help to alleviate some of the questions when 
parties attempt to determine whether or not the agreement they previously executed allows them 
to exploit a copyrighted work in a newly invented medium. 
 As is the case with a lot of litigation, most of these cases could be avoided with a little 
forethought.  When a licensee is thinking about exploiting a work in a new medium the first 
thing the licensee should do before acting on this impulse is consult an attorney.  This seemingly 
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simple act is usually the one most parties skip because (1) they think they already know the 
answer, or (2) they worry their legal counsel will complicate matters more than they need to be.  
Although these two (2) things may in fact be true, the extra step of seeking guidance from 
counsel beforehand can save a lot of time, money and headache later if/when the original 
licensor files a suit for copyright infringement.  It is always better to get an expert legal opinion 
regarding the terms and limitations of a contract before proceeding further.   
The bottom line is the money.  If there is a sufficient amount of money to be made in this 
new media (and face it, if there was not a substantial profit to be made, would the licensee be 
looking to expand into this new media?) then most licensors are going to want to argue that the 
original grant did not include this new medium.  The growing cost of litigation – attorneys’ fees, 
court costs, expert witnesses, etc. – can quickly eat away even substantial profits earned from the 
exploitation of a copyrighted work in a new medium without proper clearance.  And an even 
greater risk exists – if the first licensor succeeds; what is going to stop all the other copyright 
holders from coming after the infringer after the court finds in favor of the first copyright holder?   
If the attorney says there is a question as to whether or not exploitation in the new media 
was not included in the original agreement, the next best step is to attempt to contract directly 
with the copyright holder.  In the past some licensees have attempted to contract directly with the 
copyright holders and when they were unable to come to amicable terms, they proceeded without 
obtaining the proper clearances.
156
  This is foolish for two (2) reasons.  First, now the copyright 
holder is aware of the licensee’s intent to exploit the copyrighted work in a new medium and all 
they have to do is sit back and wait for the exploitation to occur and file a law suit for copyright 
infringement.  Second, it is going to be much more difficult to claim a defense after a failed 
attempt to secure the approval from the copyright holder.  The court is going to know the 
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licensee was aware he/she did not have the proper rights in the work and proceeded to exploit the 
material anyway.  Sadly, however, this happens in copyright litigation anyway.   
If contract negotiations fail and the licensee still wishes to exploit the work without the 
copyright holders’ consent they can seek a declaratory judgment from the courts indicating the 
use is authorized under the current agreement.  However, in this author’s opinion, if instead of 
arguing the contract includes this new media and therefore no new compensation was due to the 
copyright holder, if the licensee made an offer for just compensation to the copyright holder for 
the rights to explicitly exploit the work in the new medium any new litigation would be expressly 
barred by the new agreement.   
Unfortunately, not all licensees have the foresight to consult their attorneys before 
forging forward with the exploitation of copyrighted works in a new medium.  The question then 
becomes, what is the likely outcome if/when they are sued for copyright infringement?  As noted 
above, with the five (5) magic words “Now Known or Hereinafter Devised” already in the 
licensing contract the likelihood of success increases exponentially.   
The Supreme Court of the United States of America has not weighed in on this issue and 
the reason for this may be a simple geography problem.  It is common knowledge that the 
majority of entertainment industry is centered in New York City, New York and Los Angeles, 
California.  The only other “major” hub is Nashville, Tennessee for country music.  These three 
(3) jurisdictions see the majority of these infringement cases.  It seems unlikely the Supreme 
Court of the United States will weigh in on issue only mainly affecting three (3) jurisdictions.   
The good news, however, is there are some simple guidelines licensees can follow in 
order to limit the questions and ward off potential litigations.  First, include the five (5) magic 
words “Now Known or Hereinafter Devised” in all new licensing contracts going forward.  
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Second, when in doubt, interpret the literal words of the contract.  If a contract uses the term 
“home video” and it is not specifically defined in the agreement (Note:  going forward define all 
terms of an agreement in the writing!) then interpret this term to mean “home video” as it existed 
at the time of the creation of the agreement.  Therefore, if it was 1985 and the only “home 
videos” in existence were videocassettes then interpret “home video” to mean videocassettes for 
the terms of that agreement.   
If the licensee now wishes to exploit the work licensed in this agreement in DVD, Blu-
ray or OnDemand they need to seek a new license from the licensor.  If the licensor is not readily 
available then reasonable measures must be undertaken to locate them.  In the event, after 
reasonable efforts have been made and failed, the original licensor cannot be located then the 
licensee should move forward with the exploitation in the new medium with great caution.  Also, 
as a show of good faith, licensees should create an escrow account so they can deposit 
commercially reasonable royalties earned from this exploitation in the event the copyright holder 
ever comes forward and sues for infringement.   
If the copyright holder does in fact come forward alleging that an infringement has 
occurred, the hope is that they will accept the royalties from the escrow account as sufficient 
consideration for the exploitation of the copyrighted work in the new medium.  Even if the 
copyright holder does not feel the royalties deposited in the escrow account were sufficient 
payment for the exploitation of the copyrighted work, hopefully the court will consider the 
escrow account a sign of good faith and find in the infringers’ favor.  Also, there is a likelihood 
that the copyright holder will settle for the amount of royalties in the escrow account simply 
because, even if they considered the amount insufficient, they may feel a lengthy and costly 
litigation would not be worth fighting for the deficiency they felt they were entitled to. 
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Also if a copyright holder does come forward at a later date, he or she can then negotiate 
a more suitable rate going forward.  Or the copyright holder could bar any further exploitation of 
their work in the media going forward until he or she can settle on new royalty rate that both the 
licensee and the licensor can find satisfactory.  However, in the event the parties cannot come to 
an amicable agreement then hopefully the infringer will be in a position to cease and desist 
exploiting the copyrighted work in the medium.  If not the copyright holder will need to go to 
court to seek an injunction.  However, courts are reluctant to issue an injunction when damages 
would make a sufficient remedy.  Therefore, there is a possibility that the copyright holder will 
be denied an injunction and will need to rely on the courts to determine a fair royalty rate going 
forward. 
The next issue a licensee must consider when creating an escrow account for royalties in 
this situation is how long should they continue to set aside royalties in this escrow account?  The 
best course of action is to continue depositing royalties into the escrow account for the remaining 
term of the copyright.  Although it is fairly unlikely that a copyright holder would fail to claim 
their royalties for an extended period of time it is still the safest course of action to continue to 
deposit reasonable royalties into an escrow account for the entire term of the copyright.  An 
infringer may have a variety of defenses against a copyright holder who unreasonably delays in 
exerting their rights.  However, the only way to raise these defenses is in the context of a legal 
action.  Even if an infringer would win a legal battle with one of these defenses they would still 
have to endure the time and expense associated with a copyright law suit.  Therefore, the best 
course of action is to continue to place reasonable royalties in an escrow account for the 
copyright holder for the entire term of their copyright.     
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IV. Conclusion 
The greatest tragedy in the legal community today is that parties do not seek legal 
counsel before they act – they only come to their attorneys to help them after they have created a 
mess.  The intellectual property field is no exception to this trend and, as discussed above, with 
the advent of new media every day they should be the first ones to seek advice and guidance 
from their legal counsel before moving forward in a new medium.  It is much easier to advise a 
party before a mistake is made then it is to pick up the pieces after they have been hit with a law 
suit for damages or a preliminary injunction – both of which could cost them large sums of 
money or possibly their businesses.   
When erring on the side of caution it is best to construe contracts literally not liberally.  
Although a court may ultimately determine that an older license in fact implicitly included the 
use of the work in a newly created medium
157
, the legal fees to get to that outcome will most 
likely outweigh, or at least equal, the royalty savings that were gained by the “win” (all sarcasm 
intended because at the end of years of litigation and thousands of dollars in legal fees can this 
really be considered a “win”?) in court.   
So, ask before you act!  Ask your legal counsel to analyze the contract, or multiple 
contracts as may be in the case in many licensing arrangements, if this new medium is within the 
scope of the original agreement, or agreements.  If not, seek out the copyright holder and 
negotiate for a new license.  Offer the copyright holder a modest but fair royalty as an incentive.   
As we have all seen with the “Unchained Melody” example (discussed above) even a 
modest royalty can mean a big payout for everyone involved (both the licensee and the licensor) 
if the new license results in additional forty-four (44) weeks on the Billboard charts or its 
monetary equivalent, especially when its original run was only for thirteen (13) weeks.
158
  That is 
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the beauty of the entertainment industry, you never can tell what song, motion picture, television 
show, novel or sporting event is going to be a monster hit.  If everyone comes to amicable terms 
to exploit the copyrighted work in the new medium without the matter ending up in court it will 
be a case where everyone gets paid!  And of course…that is really the goal after all. 
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